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BOOK RE VIEWS
RE AR RANG ING DECK CHAIRS: THE NEAR-NOR MAL STATE FOR THE
NAVY STAFF
Swartz, Pe ter M., with Mi chael C. Markowitz. Or ga niz ing OPNAV (1970–2009). Al ex an dria, Va.: Cen ter
for Na val Anal y ses, Jan u ary 2010. 118pp. Avail able at www.dtic.mil.
For any in sti tu tion adapt ing to change,
the dreaded “R-word” (re or ga ni za tion)
has come to rep re sent an of ten dis rup -
tive, al beit nec es sary, tran si tion. But as
the Cen ter for Na val Anal y ses (CNA)
au thors Pe ter Swartz and Mi chael
Markowitz clearly high light, re or ga ni -
za tion has been the near-nor mal state
for the Navy Staff (OPNAV) over the
past sev eral de cades. Con ducted un der
the spon sor ship of the Na val His tory
and Her i tage Com mand, this CNA re -
port ef fec tively tracks the nu mer ous
changes in the or ga ni za tion of OPNAV
in re sponse to changes both in Chiefs of 
Na val Op er a tions (CNOs) and in the
stra te gic and bud get ary en vi ron ments
since 1970. 
As ex pe ri enced CNA re search ers,
Swartz and Markowitz have ap plied
their knowl edge and ex pe ri ence in anal -
y sis, pol icy, and his tory to as sem ble a
highly ac cu rate and cred i ble com pen -
dium of the me chan ics of change in
OPNAV over a forty-year span. Swartz
has spe cial in sight here. As a for mer
Navy cap tain, he served on the OPNAV
staff dur ing part of the pe riod cov ered
by this re port and is cur rently CNA’s
ad viser to the Strat egy and Pol icy Di vi -
sion (N51), giv ing him both an out -
sider’s and in sider’s view of the pro cess
and per son al i ties. 
The study fo cuses on an swer ing three
prin ci pal ques tions: What have been the 
sig nif i cant changes to the OPNAV staff, 
why were these changes made, and what 
ob ser va tions and con clu sions can be
drawn from these changes? Swartz and
Markowitz ad mit that the em pha sis of
the study was in the “data-gath er ing
task” em bod ied in the first ques tion.
Also, some read ers may find the
“PowerPoint with heavy no ta tion” for -
mat of the study off-putt ing. How ever,
this for mat lends it self to un der stand ing 
the com plex struc tures, timelines, and
mach i na tions of the re or ga ni za tion ef -
forts of each suc ces sive CNO from the
1970s on ward. 
The tax on omy used by Swartz and
Markowitz in pre sent ing and cat e go riz -
ing the myr iad changes in the OPNAV
staff struc ture pro vides a highly un der -
stand able and or dered re view of the
com pli cated and some times con fus ing
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or ga ni za tional ad ap ta tions. Es pe cially
use ful are the four “con text” ta bles, one 
for each de cade start ing with the 1970s,
that list by year who was pre sid ing as
CNO, along with the rel e vant Navy cap -
stone doc u ments, the Navy’s “to tal
[that is, fi nan cial] ob li ga tion au thor -
ity,” to tal num ber of ships in the fleet,
new ships ar riv ing in the fleet, ac tive
per son nel, and new ca pa bil i ties in tro -
duced. Jux ta posed against the nu mer -
ous or ga ni za tional charts in the re port,
these con text ta bles help in un der stand -
ing how each CNO has re or ga nized, not 
only re spond ing to the va ri ety of ex og e -
nous forces but also to im ple ment his
own vi sion for the fu ture of the Navy.
By re count ing in de tail the re or ga ni za -
tion that the cur rent CNO, Ad mi ral
Gary Roughead, has made to the staff,
read ers can see for them selves the most
con se quen tial changes en acted and, by
ex ten sion, the most con se quen tial is -
sues fac ing the Navy to day, in
Roughead’s view.
Swartz and Markowitz iden tify two 
ma jor changes made by Ad mi ral
Roughead. First is the con sol i da tion of
the In tel li gence (N2) and the Com mu -
ni ca tions Net works (N6) di rec tor ates
into a newly cre ated Di rec tor ate for In -
for ma tion Dom i nance (N2/6), a move
that un der scores the crit i cal im por tance 
of a ho lis tic ap proach to com mu ni ca -
tions and in tel li gence, in clud ing the
emerg ing pre em i nence of cyber and
elec tronic war fare. The fu ture im pact of 
this con sol i da tion could be quite large,
given the is sues at stake.
Sec ond, equally as re veal ing has been
the morphing of the staff’s in ter nal
think tank, “Deep Blue,” into the Qua -
dren nial De fense Re view (QDR) cell to
meet the chal lenges of the re cent QDR,
and fi nally into the Na val War fare
In te gra tion Group (00X), in late 2009.
One func tion of 00X will be, act ing as a
“spe cial as sis tants” group, to pro vide
the CNO with di rect as sess ments of
Navy pro grams and sys tems. Plainly,
this CNO sees a crit i cal need to be
armed with as much in for ma tion and
anal y sis as pos si ble to ad dress the tre -
men dous bud get ary pres sures af fect ing
the Navy, which pose a spe cial chal -
lenge to the fu ture health of the na val
force, a chal lenge re quir ing par tic u lar
at ten tion and fo cus.
Where the study it self is ad mit tedly thin 
is in its nar ra tives—which might have
been richer—of the col or ful per son al i -
ties, nuanced forces, and in sti tu tional
ri val ries that sculpted the shape of the
OPNAV staff dur ing a very dy namic pe -
riod. Those want ing an Allisonian-like
ex am i na tion of the or ga ni za tional, po -
lit i cal, and per sonal dy nam ics shap ing
this change will have to wait for what
Swartz and Markowitz rec om mend as
next steps: an ex pan sion of the study to
per son al i ties, re la tion ships, and in-
depth an swers to the “why” ques tion.
Un til then, schol ars of U.S. Navy his -
tory and or ga ni za tional stud ies can be
con tent with this well re searched, ac cu -
rate, and in for ma tive re port.
THOMAS CULORA, Chair man, War fare Anal y sis
and Re search De part ment
Na val War Col lege
Drezner, Dan iel W., ed. Avoid ing Trivia: The Role
of Stra te gic Plan ning in Amer i can For eign Pol icy.
Wash ing ton, D.C.: Brookings In sti tu tion Press,
2009. 230pp. $24.95 
Stu dents of Amer i can na tional se cu rity
pol icy, par tic u larly those with out the
ben e fit of first hand pol icy-mak ing
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ex pe ri ence, fre quently un der- or over -
es ti mate the dif fi culty of for mu lat ing
and im ple ment ing strat egy in the U.S.
gov ern ment. As a re sult, ob serv ers tend
ei ther to por tray se nior pol icy mak ers
as dolts or in com pe tents or to en gage in 
a sort of stra te gic ni hil ism hold ing that
it is im pos si ble to de velop sound strat -
egy in this day and age.
Dan iel Drezner’s in for ma tive col lec tion 
Avoid ing Trivia de serves to be read by
schol ars of both va ri et ies. It con tains es -
says that were com mis sioned for a 2008 
con fer ence held at the Fletcher School
of Law and Di plo macy at Tufts Uni ver -
sity to com mem o rate the six ti eth an ni -
ver sary of the State De part ment’s pol icy 
plan ning of fice, an or ga ni za tion best
known for its first di rec tor, George
Kennan, and his suc ces sor, Paul H.
Nitze. The con tri bu tors are largely
scholar-prac ti tio ners, in clud ing sev eral
of my own coun ter parts dur ing my ser -
vice as dep uty assistant sec re tary of
defense dur ing the George W. Bush
ad min is tra tion.
The first sec tion of the book in cludes
con tri bu tions by Rich ard Haass, Da vid
Gordon and Dan iel Twin ing, and
Jeffrey Legro, who dis cuss the stra te gic
en vi ron ment and the chal lenges it poses 
for pol icy plan ning in the United States.
Bruce Jentleson, Aaron Friedberg, and
Pe ter Feaver and Wil liam Inboden are
found in the sec ond sec tion, dis cuss ing
how stra te gic plan ning can best be im -
ple mented in the ex ec u tive branch. The
lat ter chap ter, de scrib ing the res ur rec -
tion of the stra te gic plan ning func tion
at the Na tional Se cu rity Coun cil dur ing
the George W. Bush ad min is tra tion, is
par tic u larly in sight ful.
Es says by Amy Zegart, Thomas Wright,
An drew Erdmann, and Ste ven Krasner
cover the op por tu ni ties and lim i ta tions
for stra te gic plan ning in the fi nal
sec tion.
This work col lec tively em pha sizes the
im per a tive of stra te gic plan ning as well
as why it is an art whose prac tice is dif -
fi cult. It de serves the at ten tion of schol -
ars and prac ti tio ners alike.
THOMAS G. MAHNKEN
Na val War Col lege
Nielson, Su zanne C., and Don M. Snider, eds.
Amer i can Civil-Mil i tary Re la tions: The Sol dier
and the State in a New Era. Bal ti more: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 2009. 409pp. $34.95
Sam uel J. Hun ting ton pub lished his
sem i nal work on Amer i can civil-
mil i tary re la tions, The Sol dier and the
State, in 1957. His anal y sis, re flec tive of
the U.S. ex pe ri ence in World War II,
Ko rea, and the Cold War, was de signed
to “max i mize mil i tary se cu rity at the
least sac ri fice to other so cial val ues.” It
has pro vided a the o ret i cal and prac ti cal
guide to civil-mil i tary re la tions for
more than fifty years. How ever, in this
“new era” of the first de cade of the
twenty-first cen tury, many have chal -
lenged the con tin ued rel e vance of Hun -
ting ton’s the o ries.
In 2007, ed i tors Su zanne Nielson and
Don Snider as sem bled an im pres sive in -
ter dis ci plin ary group of schol ars to an a -
lyze Hun ting ton’s the o ries in light of
the Amer i can ex pe ri ence since 1957.
Fif teen re search ers pro duced a dozen
es says ad dress ing Hun ting ton’s main
the o ret i cal con tri bu tions: the func -
tional and so ci etal im per a tives that
shape the na ture of the mil i tary or ga ni -
za tion, the sub jec tive and ob jec tive pat -
terns of ci vil ian con trol of the mil i tary,
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and the de vel op ment of the mil i tary of -
fi cer corps as a pro fes sion. The book
serves as a di a logue on those the o ries
and pro duces of ten-di verg ing view -
points about Hun ting ton’s ideas and
the con di tion of the Amer i can civil-
mil i tary re la tion ship. 
Re gard ing Hun ting ton’s “The Cri sis of
Amer i can Civil-Mil i tary Re la tions,” the
book be gins with the cur rent state of
civil-mil i tary re la tions. Rich ard D. Betts 
sug gests that while ten sion may ex ist
be tween the mil i tary and its ci vil ian
lead er ship, it is not un usual, given the
re al i ties of our dem o cratic sys tem. This
is so be cause “ob jec tive con trol,” al -
though not of a pure form, has kept the
mil i tary obe di ent to var i ous ad min is -
tra tions. Mat thew Moten dis cusses Sec -
re tary Don ald Rumsfeld’s lead er ship of
the De part ment of De fense, char ac ter iz -
ing it as a pe riod of “bro ken di a logue”
marked by “dis trust within the Pen ta -
gon and through out the de fense es tab -
lish ment.” Gen eral Eric Shinseki,
re tired Army chief of staff, serves as a
model for the mil i tary re sponse to such
strong ci vil ian lead er ship, pro vid ing
force ful mil i tary ad vice in pri vate, while 
pub licly sup port ing po lit i cal su pe ri ors. 
The as sem bled au thors agree that mil i -
tary of fi cers should avoid po lit i cal in -
volve ment. When mil i tary and ci vil ian
lead ers dis agree on se cu rity pol icy, sev -
eral au thors state, res ig na tion is not an
op tion for the mil i tary of fi cer, since it is 
an in her ently po lit i cal act. Yet James
Burk com ments that mil i tary of fi cers
are also mor ally au ton o mous and ac -
count able for their ac tions, not “purely
in stru men tal” agents of the state. Dis -
cuss ing Hun ting ton’s as ser tion that the
“mil i tary mind” should re flect a con ser -
va tive out look in sup port of Amer i can
in sti tu tions, Darrell Driver cites re search 
sug gest ing that no such uni fy ing con ser -
va tive ide ol ogy ex ists. Yet a num ber of
au thors com ment on the over whelm ing
Re pub li can Party af fil i a tion of mil i tary
per son nel. Other au thors dis cuss im -
prove ment of pro fes sional mil i tary ed u -
ca tion, ex pan sion of mil i tary mis sions to 
in clude sta bil ity op er a tions,
“Madi-sonian” ap proach to na tional se -
cu rity and ci vil ian con trol, and the re -
spon si bil ity of mil i tary pro fes sion als to
build trust with ci vil ian lead ers of in con -
sis tent mil i tary ex per tise. 
In the fi nal chap ter, Nielson and Snider
ad vance nine con clu sions re sult ing
from their re search (how ever, not all
con tri bu tors are in agree ment). The last 
is prob a bly the most in struc tive, that
Hun ting ton’s work pro vides “con tin u -
ing value” to the dis cus sion re gard ing
Amer i can civil-mil i tary re la tions. This
book is best re garded as a com men tary
on Hun ting ton’s 1957 work, one that
also pro vides a good re view of the cur -
rent schol ar ship on Amer i can civil-
mil i tary re la tions the ory and ex pe ri ence.
How ever, keep a copy of Hun ting ton
nearby as you read it. 
DAYNE NIX
Na val War Col lege
Asmus, Ron ald D. A Lit tle War That Shook the
World: Geor gia, Rus sia, and the Fu ture of the West. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 272pp. $27
In Au gust 2008, Rus sia shat tered the
post–Cold War peace in Eu rope by in -
vad ing the for mer So viet re pub lic of
Geor gia. Though only days long, that
war dashed NATO’s hopes to ex pand to 
the Cau ca sus and sparked fun da men tal
re eval u a tions of Amer i can and Eu ro -
pean Un ion (EU) re la tions with Rus sia.
B O O K  R E V I E W S 1 5 5
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Ron ald Asmus’s A Lit tle War That
Shook the World is an en gag ing read
that com bines the best avail able his tory
of the war with a broader anal y sis of the 
geopolitical forces that led to it.
Asmus is well po si tioned to write this
book. He was a se nior Clinton of fi cial
deal ing with NATO en large ment, and
since 2001 he has been a se nior re -
searcher at the Ger man Mar shall Fund.
Asmus has wide ac cess to U.S. and EU
of fi cials, and al though un com monly
well con nected in Geor gia, he is not a
sup porter of Pres i dent Mikheil
Saakashvili. While Rus sian sources were 
not forth com ing, over all this is a very
well doc u mented ac count.
The book of fers a blow-by-blow ac -
count of pre war di plo macy and the
con duct of the war, with lively por traits
of key per son al i ties. Asmus also puts
the war in the con text of post–Cold
War Eu rope, ar gu ing that the war was
about much more than Geor gia. Strik -
ing at Tbilisi sent a mes sage to Wash -
ing ton and Brussels. It cul mi nated
Rus sia’s decadelong frus tra tion with an
in ter na tional or der it be lieved to be
fun da men tally against it. From a West -
ern per spec tive, for mer War saw Pact
na tions had been freely choosing to as -
so ci ate with NATO and the EU, in an
en vi ron ment where force and “spheres
of in flu ence” were passé. Rus sia, un der
Pres i dent Vladi mir Putin, saw in stead
en croach ment and a run ning rough -
shod over Rus sian con cerns (as when
NATO ig nored Rus sia on Kosovo).
NATO’s half hearted moves to ward ad -
mit ting Geor gia and Ukraine in early
2008 of fered Putin a win dow to act.
Geor gia’s “frozen” sep a rat ist con flicts
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia pro -
vided a pre text that was aided by the
rash ness of Saakashvili and the dith er -
ing of the Eu ro pe ans.
Asmus sheds light on im por tant ques -
tions like whether the United States
gave the “green light” to Tbilisi to es ca -
late (Asmus con vinc ingly ar gues it did
not) and whether Rus sia’s in va sion was
pre planned or op por tu nis tic (Asmus
be lieves it was pre planned). Iron i cally,
Geor gia’s prep a ra tions for NATO
mem ber ship hurt its mil i tary ca pa bil ity: 
when war started, 40 per cent of its army 
was in Iraq or pre par ing to leave. Ac -
cord ing to NATO doc trine, Geor gia
had trained and equipped for peace -
keep ing op er a tions, not ter ri to rial
de fense.
Asmus sug gests that more adroit NATO 
di plo macy would have averted the war.
He lays out a clear and com pel ling case, 
but given Rus sia’s dem on strated will -
ing ness to in cur costs, the claim is not
fully con vinc ing. Even Pres i dent George 
W. Bush was far less will ing to risk a
U.S.-Rus sian con flict than were the Eu -
ro pe ans. The dis par i ties of in ter est, risk
tol er ance, and ge og ra phy made the
Western goal of a Geor gia in NATO
very dif fi cult with out a fight, but Asmus 
is cor rect that the United States and the
EU could have better played their
hands.
What emerges is a larger story of Amer -
i can over stretch and a fail ure to bal ance 
ends and means. The United States si -
mul ta neously wanted to have its way in
the Bal kans and the Cau ca sus; to ob tain 
Rus sian sup port for Ira nian sanc tions,
Afghan lo gis tics, and counterterrorism;
and to en joy ac tive EU sup port for all
that, even as U.S. po lices were highly
un pop u lar among EU vot ers. Wash ing -
ton did not cred i bly back its Geor gia
pol icy mil i tarily or po lit i cally, nor
would it choose be tween com pet ing
5
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goals. Asmus thinks more skill and res -
o lu tion might have car ried this
through, but one won ders whether the
big ger les son is n’t re ally about the fi nite 
na ture of na tional power.
DA VID T. BURBACH
Na val War Col lege
Cronin, Aud rey Kurth. How Ter ror ism Ends: Un -
der stand ing the De cline and De mise of Ter ror ist
Cam paigns. Prince ton, N.J.: Prince ton Univ.
Press, 2010. 311pp. $29.95
Aud rey Kurth Cronin’s en gag ing and
en light en ing book ex am ines how ter -
ror ist move ments come to an end, fo -
cus ing al most ex clu sively on ter ror ist
or ga ni za tions over the last half-cen tury. 
She of fers six path ways by which ter ror -
ist groups end: de cap i ta tion, ne go ti a -
tion, suc cess, fail ure, re pres sion, and
re ori en ta tion. 
One of the book’s strengths is that it
cap tures the full spec trum of pos si ble
out comes for ter ror ist or ga ni za tions
and ex plains why par tic u lar cam paigns
did or did not end. The or ga ni za tion of
the book is laud able—by look ing in
each chap ter at tac tics and strat e gies for 
end ing ter ror ism, rather than sim ply
march ing through case stud ies, one is
able to ex am ine more so berly spe cific
stra te gic ap proaches to counter -
terrorism and their ef fects. In this re -
gard, this book will be very use ful for
pol icy mak ers and counterterrorism
prac ti tio ners. 
Cronin is cau tious in mak ing causal
claims. For ex am ple, in her chap ter on
de cap i ta tion she rec og nizes that kill ing
the lead ers of ter ror ist or ga ni za tions
has some times con trib uted to the
even tual end of the or ga ni za tion
(Sendero Luminoso, for ex am ple) but
in other cases has not (Hamas). Though 
she does of fer in sights into the dif fer ent 
out comes, she tem pers her con clu sions
by em pha siz ing that the act of de cap i ta -
tion pro vides “crit i cal in sight into the
depth and na ture of a group’s pop u lar
sup port.” In ef fect, one can not know in
ad vance. 
The fi nal chap ter, “How Al-Qaeda
Ends,” at tempts to ap ply some of these
les sons. Cronin con vinc ingly ar gues
that de cap i ta tion will not end al-Qa‘ida. 
Be liefs that de cap i ta tion will have a dra -
matic im pact on that or ga ni za tion are
“tinged with emo tion, not dis pas sion ate 
anal y sis.” Kill ing Bin Laden, Cronin ar -
gues, might “ac tu ally en hance his stat -
ure, in prac ti cal terms.” 
Al though Cronin firmly states that all
ter ror ist groups end, this re viewer read
the fi nal chap ter won der ing whether
there are nu mer ous as pects of al-Qa‘ida 
(all of which Cronin notes in some ca -
pac ity) that make it a can di date for
some form of ir rel e vant per pe tu ity
among ter ror ist or ga ni za tions. It is
trans na tional in in flu ence like no other
group in Cronin’s study. In 2001,
al-Qa‘ida struck an un prec e dented blow 
against the sole global su per power.
Cronin as serts that the group’s mes sage
will have stay ing power for some peo ple 
as a call for re sis tance that will en dure
for many years, no mat ter what Bin
Laden’s fate. This may be an un prec e -
dented rec ipe for un usual lon gev ity. 
A com bi na tion of in creased counter -
terrorism mea sures, a mil i tary of fen sive 
in Af ghan i stan, and al-Qa‘ida’s own un -
derrec og nized or ga ni za tional and op er -
a tional de fi cien cies have ren dered the
group un able to ex e cute a suc cess ful
B O O K  R E V I E W S 1 5 7
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at tack in the United States since 9/11.
There is good rea son to ex pect that 9/11 
will prove to have been the apex of
al-Qa‘ida’s op er a tional ef fec tive ness.
But a fi nal end ing for the group’s fol -
low ing may be gen er a tions away, when
the mem o ries of both 9/11 and the in -
va sions of Iraq and Af ghan i stan have
faded.
AN DREW L. STIGLER
Na val War Col lege
Brown, J. D., Car rier Op er a tions in World War II.
Ed ited by Da vid Hobbs. Vol. 3. Annapolis, Md.:
Na val In sti tute Press, 2009. 320pp. $72.95
De vel oped by J. D. Brown over many
years as the third vol ume of a tril ogy,
Car rier Op er a tions in World War II is an 
exhaustively re searched his tory, with
the fin est col lec tion of air craft and car -
rier pho to graphs one can pos si bly
imag ine. Brown was an avi a tion ob -
server for twelve years in the Royal
Navy, a his to rian, and ul ti mately head
of the Royal Navy His tor i cal Branch.
This work com bines ma te rial from two
ear lier stud ies as well as new data.
At Brown’s un timely death in 2001, his
close friend Da vid Hobbs, cu ra tor of
the Fleet Air Arm Mu seum at Yeovilton 
Air Base—him self a pi lot in the Royal
Navy for thirty-three years—took up
the torch and com pleted the third vol -
ume. In do ing so he pro duced a highly
de tailed nar ra tive of car rier op er a tions
for ev ery ma jor the ater of the Sec ond
World War, as well as the de tail ing of
spe cial car rier forces cre ated for par tic -
u lar op er a tions. Jump ing di rectly to op -
er a tions, with out any pre lim i nary
ex pla na tion, Hobbs pres ents Brown’s
me tic u lous doc u men ta tion of car rier
op er a tions in a read able and highly nar -
ra tive ac count.
Brown and Hobbs both have im pec ca -
ble cre den tials for writ ing this book.
With out ques tion the ma te rial amassed
by Brown rep re sents a sin gle-source
gold mine for schol ars and buffs alike.
Un for tu nately, though, there is not a
sin gle foot note in the en tire vol ume.
Thus what could have been a valu able
schol arly work, re plete with trace able
link age to orig i nal sources, is trans -
formed into sim ply a de tailed nar ra tive. 
Yet it is well worth its price for the pho -
to graphs alone.
The first half fo cuses al most ex clu sively
on Brit ish car rier op er a tions, mov ing
from the At lan tic and Arc tic oceans to
the Med i ter ra nean and Aegean seas, the 
In dian Ocean, and ul ti mately to the Pa -
cific Ocean in the lat ter stages of the
war. The re main der of the book fo cuses 
pri mar ily on Amer i can and Jap a nese
car rier ac tions from Pearl Har bor
through prep a ra tions for Op er a tion
OLYMPIC and the pro jected 1 No vem -
ber 1945 in va sion of Kyushu in the
Pa cific.
The vol ume in cludes an ac cu rate list ing
of air craft car ri ers and other ships, their 
em barked squad rons, the types and
num bers of air craft they flew, and the
lo ca tions in volved. Where ap pro pri ate,
there are vi gnettes of ships’ per son nel,
pi lots, and aircrew . The pho to graphs
in cluded through out—many of which
are from Brown’s pri vate col lec tion and 
never be fore pub lished—give an in cred -
i ble in sight into the air craft and the 
car ri ers from which they flew as tech -
nol ogy pro gressed through out the war.
Car rier Op er a tions in World War II is an 
es pe cially use ful com pan ion to other
vol umes con sid er ing spe cific na val bat -
tles or as pects of the war at sea.
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With Hobbs’s ex pert help, Brown’s in -
tended pur pose of of fer ing a clear pic -
ture of ev ery car rier and air ac tion of
World War II has been achieved.
DOUGLAS SMITH
Na val War Col lege
Blake, John. The Sea Chart: An Il lus trated His tory
of Nau ti cal Maps and Nav i ga tional Charts.
Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Na val In sti tute Press, 2009.
160pp. $39.95
Only on oc ca sion will an au thor and
pub lisher pro duce a work of re mark able 
beauty and ex cel lence. John Blake’s il -
lus trated his tory of nau ti cal maps and
nav i ga tional charts, now avail able in
pa per back, is one such de light. 
Com mander Blake is a for mer Royal
Navy of fi cer and a fel low of the Royal
In sti tute of Nav i ga tion. He not only
knows what sea charts are about but has 
had priv i leged ac cess to the trea sure
trove of Brit ish chart ing housed in the
Hy dro graphic Of fice, which in jour nal -
is tic terms is a ver i ta ble scoop.
Blake re lates the de vel op ment of the sea 
chart from the days when manu scripts
were drawn on sheep skins, such as the
portolan charts that sur vived from the
thir teenth cen tury, through the mar i -
time as cen dancy of the Span ish and
Por tu guese, then the Dutch, French,
and Brit ish through the eigh teenth cen -
tury, when the dis cov ery and chart ing
of the coasts and the oceans of the globe 
had be come a stra te gic na val and com -
mer cial re quire ment, to the mod ern
Ad mi ralty charts of to day. 
In do ing so Blake brings to gether an
out stand ing col lec tion of charts, some
never be fore re pro duced, culled from
Brit ish, Span ish, French, Neth er lands,
and Amer i can or i gins, with a look also
at Chi nese, Jap a nese, and In dian charts. 
Other sources in clude some of the most 
im por tant mar i time ar chives of the
world, in clud ing the Li brary of Con -
gress and the His panic So ci ety of Amer -
ica in the United States, as well as the
Na tional Mar i time Mu seum, Ad mi ralty 
Li brary, and Hy dro graphic Of fice. The
qual ity of re pro duc tion is out stand ing.
The fore word by HRH the Duke of
York leads in to the open ing chap ters,
which look at how nav i ga tion and nav i -
ga tional tools (in clud ing the de vel op -
ment of the chro nom e ter to al low
de ter mi na tion of lon gi tude at sea), ce -
les tial nav i ga tion, and sur vey ing de vel -
oped. Other chap ters look at the chart
as the key to ex plo ra tion geo graph i cally 
through each the ater of the globe, then
chro no log i cally within each chap ter.
There is also a mul ti plic ity of sig nif i cant 
and in ter est ing his tor i cal charts and
mar i time doc u ments, such as the per -
sonal tide ta bles of Sir Fran cis Drake,
the tak ing of a slave-trade ship off Af -
rica, and charts of the early-twen ti eth-
cen tury Ant arc tic ex plor ers such as
Cap tain Rob ert Scott and Er nest
Shackle ton. 
Un usual his tor i cal in sights are in cluded 
as stand-alone vi gnettes, such as how
the im mense cu ri os ity of Benjamin
Frank lin, both on his first trans at lan tic
cross ing from Lon don to Phil a del phia
in 1726, and as dep uty post mas ter gen -
eral for the Amer i can col o nies in the
1760s, caused him to in ves ti gate the
dis par ity be tween east–west and west–
east cross ing times. His un der stand ing
of the Gulf Stream led to his At lan tic
charts that showed how best to ex ploit
it and so speeded the mail be tween Eu -
rope and the Amer i cas.
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A com pre hen sive bib li og ra phy cu ri -
ously omits any ref er ence to the Brit ish
Li brary in Lon don, which holds the 
sec ond-larg est col lec tion of manu script
sea charts in the world.
The Sea Chart’s ap peal is to a wider
read er ship than just mar i ners, lei sured
or pro fes sional. It is a must for all
whose in ter est is in grasp ing how
Earth’s con ti nents and oceans were
charted and our world was shaped. 
LAW RENCE PHILLIPS 
Ed i tor, The Royal Navy Day by Day
Middlesex, United King dom
Norton, Louis Ar thur. Cap tains Con ten tious: The
Dys func tional Sons of the Brine. Co lum bia: Univ.
of South Carolina Press, 2009. 185pp. $29.95
“Honor,” as Douglass Adair ex plains in
Fame and Found ing Fa thers (1974), “is
an ethic of com pe ti tion, of strug gle for
em i nence and dis tinc tion.” “In a par tic -
u lar cul ture,” he writes, “a sense of
honor—a sense of due self-es teem, of
proper pride, of dig nity ap pro pri ate to
his sta tion—acts like con science for a
prac tic ing Chris tian.” Adair ar gues that
“the lust for the psy chic re ward of fame, 
honor, and glory, af ter 1776 be comes a
key in gre di ent in the be hav ior of Wash -
ing ton and his great est con tem po rar -
ies.” Greg ory D. Massey ob serves in
John Laurens and the Amer i can Rev o lu -
tions (2000), “Like his fel low of fi cers,
[Con ti nen tal Army col o nel John]
Laurens val ued his honor or rep u ta tion
above all else. Honor, more than any -
thing, de fined a man.” What Chris to -
pher McKee says about the U.S. Navy
of fi cer corps of 1794–1815 in A Gen tle -
manly and Hon or able Pro fes sion: The
Cre ations of the U.S. Na val Of fi cer
Corps, 1794–1815 (1991) ap plies equally 
well to na val of fi cers of the Rev o lu tion:
“Un less this search for fame . . . is rec -
og nized as a pri mary el e ment in the
eth i cal air breathed by the na val of fi cers 
. . . , a true un der stand ing of that corps
is . . . im pos si ble.” 
Lack ing this es sen tial un der stand ing of
the place of honor in the value sys tem
of the late eigh teenth cen tury, Louis Ar -
thur Norton, pro fes sor emer i tus at the
Uni ver sity of Con nect i cut and au thor
of sev eral works on nau ti cal themes, has 
built a wrong headed ar gu ment about
the char ac ter of the Con ti nen tal navy
of fi cer corps.
Norton’s ti tle en cap su lates his the -
sis—that cap tains of the fledg ling
Amer i can navy were ex ces sively con -
cerned with their honor, mak ing them
un usu ally con ten tious, which in turn
im peded their ef fec tive ness and harmed 
the Con ti nen tal navy. Norton be lieves
these cap tains’ pre oc cu pa tion with per -
sonal honor and rank was in dic a tive of
dys func tional per son al i ties dom i nated
by nar cis sism, am bi tion, ob ses sion with 
or der, and ag gres sion, rather than in -
dic a tive of the shared val ues of their
time, the same val ues that mo ti vated
Wash ing ton, Ad ams, Jef fer son, Ham il -
ton, and Mad i son.
The heart of Cap tains Con ten tious com -
prises five chap ters, de voted re spec -
tively to the Con ti nen tal navy ca reers of 
John Manley, Silas Tal bot, Dudley
Saltonstall, Joshua Bar ney, and John
Paul Jones. The choice of these five is
some what ar bi trary, for one—Tal bot
never even held a Con ti nen tal navy
com mand. None of these bi og ra phies
makes a con vinc ing case that these men
were more con ten tious or touchy about 
rank than their con tem po rar ies in other 
armed ser vices. Any one fa mil iar with
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in ter per sonal con flicts within the Royal
Navy of the era must dis miss Norton’s
as ser tion that the Brit ish na val of fi cers
were less con ten tious than their Amer i -
can coun ter parts. Nor does Norton
dem on strate that the strong per son al i -
ties of the of fi cers he stud ies harmed
the ef fec tive ness of the na val ser vice.
This book has an ex ten sive bib li og ra -
phy, but a sin gle ex am ple will il lus trate
the sloppy use of those sources. Norton
states on page 2 that com mon sail ors
who con tin ued sea go ing into mid dle
age of ten re tired ashore as bro ken men,
whereas the source he cites in fact re -
futes that no tion.
Cap tains Con ten tious is not what it pur -
ports to be—a use ful study of the con -
nec tions be tween lead er ship and
per son al ity. In stead, set ting aside its
wrong headed the sis, it is a col lec tion of
five un con nected brief bi og ra phies in
the tra di tion of “lives of dis tin guished
na val of fi cers.”
MI CHAEL J. CRAWFORD
Na val His tory and Her i tage Com mand
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